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While evidence suggests that industry inventors’ interactions with universities enhance 
invention value, the role of interaction governance has so far been overlooked. Relying on an 
original survey of industry inventors of European patents based in Italy, we show that 
governance matters. Personal contractual collaborations between firms and individual 
academics lead to higher-value inventions than collaborations mediated by university 
institutions. The former enable more effective exploitation of academic knowledge, by 
facilitating its full transmission and integration into the firm’s knowledge base. 
 
Key words: University-industry interactions, governance of collaborations, knowledge transfer, 
invention value, inventor survey, patent value. 





A large body of evidence, particularly since the 1990s, has shown that interactions with 
universities enhance industrial innovation in several ways, helping firms to develop products 
and processes that otherwise would not be developed or would be developed with substantial 
delays (Mansfield, 1991, 1998), and supporting better performance in terms of investment in 
R&D (Adams et al., 2003), higher levels of innovation (Zucker et al., 2002; Cassiman et al., 
2012), and firm sales (Belderbos et al., 2004). Industry inventions that build on scientific 
knowledge tend to embody higher quality and relevance (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; 
Cassiman et al., 2008), particularly when industry researchers have the opportunity to engage in 
direct interactions with academics (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Fabrizio, 2009; Arts and 
Veugelers, 2018; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Dornbusch and Neuhäusler, 2015).  
However, limited efforts have so far been made to understand the extent to which the value of 
industry inventions is influenced by the interactions’ governance. Some studies explore the 
determinants of different types of governance (Cassiman et al., 2010; Bodas Freitas et al., 
2013), but ignore the latter’s effects on the value of the resulting inventions. Conversely, among 
studies investigating the determinants of the value of patented industrial inventions (see reviews 
in Reitzig, 2003, Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003, and Gambardella et al., 
2008), few explicitly consider the governance of the inventors’ interactions with universities. 
Most explore the correlation between a patent’s quality, proxied by the number of forward 
citations it receives (Lerner, 1994; Hall et al., 2007), and its reliance on scientific knowledge, 
proxied most often by its share of citations to the non-patent literature (Reitzig, 2003; Sapsalis 
et al., 2006; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Cassiman et al., 2008; Arts and Fleming, 2018), or 
the scientific affiliations of its co-inventors (Gittelman, 2005; Cassiman et al., 2012; Dornbusch 
and Neuhäusler, 2015). Other work links firms’ innovative performance to collaborative 
activities with academics, such as firms’ co-publications with ‘star scientists’ in basic research 
(Colen et al., 2014), firms’ co-patenting with academic ‘Pasteur’ scientists that span the 
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boundaries between academia and industry in applied research fields (Stokes, 1997; Baba et al., 
2009), and firms’ R&D alliances with universities (Subramanian et al., 2013).  
The effect on invention value of the type of governance of university-industry interactions 
remains largely unexplored, despite evidence showing that the governance of interactions alters 
the incentives for parties to share knowledge (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Oxley and 
Sampson, 2004; Foss et al., 2010 Lakemond et al., 2016), and to translate it in ways that make it 
easier for the other party to absorb it and integrate it with its existing knowledge base (Badir et 
al., 2009; Foss et al., 2011; Schofield, 2013). In turn, greater knowledge absorption and 
integration increase firms’ ability to produce more and better quality innovations (Cassiman et 
al., 2008; George et al., 2008; Fabrizio, 2009; Foss et al., 2011; Kotha et al., 2011).  
The present study is based on original evidence from a survey of patent inventors working in 
industry - the PIEMINV survey (Cecchelli et al., 2012), and has several novel aspects. First, it 
proposes an original approach to the measurement of invention value which mitigates some of 
the traditional problems associated to inventor estimations: the ratio between the value of the 
invention that benefited the most from the contribution of academic knowledge, and the value of 
the most valuable invention in the inventor’s portfolio. Instead of depending on precise value 
estimations, this variable only requires inventors to rank their own inventions based on their 
value. Second, the study evaluates the relative impact of two alternative types of governance of 
university-industry interactions (personal contracts stipulated with individual academic 
researchers and institutional contracts stipulated with the university) on the value of 
collaborative inventions produced by industry researchers. We employ various model 
specifications to control for selection bias and endogeneity, and individual and firm 
characteristics that might affect the value of an invention.  
The empirical findings suggest that the type of interaction governance is relevant to the creation 
of economic value. Compared to institutional contracts, personal contracts give the firm greater 
control over the collaboration’s objectives, and motivate academics to put more effort into 
translating their knowledge, so that it can be more effectively absorbed and integrated into the 
firm’s knowledge base. Personal contracts also allow the firm to appropriate more of the 
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knowledge resulting from the collaboration. High appropriability encourages industry inventors 
to share their tacit knowledge more freely with academic collaborators, which further facilitates 
knowledge integration. Since personal contracts allow greater integration of academic 
knowledge with the firm’s knowledge, all else being equal they are conducive to the production 
of more valuable industrial inventions. This underscores the importance of promoting the 
integration of academic knowledge in the firm’s knowledge base through both the development 
of absorptive capacity on the part of the firm, and contractual arrangements that encourage 
academics to invest effort in the translation of academic knowledge. 
 
2. The governance of university-industry interactions and the value of industry 
inventions 
2.1. The link between interaction governance and invention value 
Evidence suggests that reliance on scientific knowledge enhances the quality of firms’ 
inventions. Patents that contain references to scientific papers are more frequently cited 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), and tend to generate forward citations in a broader range of 
technological fields (Cassiman et al., 2008). In particular, direct interactions between academic 
scientists and industry researchers, compared to access to disembodied knowledge, enhance 
invention value. It has been shown that the industry patents display higher quality if the industry 
researcher has close personal links to academia, previous experience of working in a public lab 
(Gittelman, 2005), experience of co-publication with academics (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; 
Fabrizio, 2009; Arts and Veugelers, 2018), or has been part of a mixed team of academic and 
industry inventors (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Dornbusch and Neuhäusler, 2015). It has also been 
shown that firms’ collaborations with star scientists - particularly boundary spanning scientists 
who both patent and publish - increase patent quality and importance (Cockburn and 
Henderson, 1998; Zucker and Darby, 2001, Zucker et al., 2002; Baba et al., 2009; Subramanian 
et al., 2013; Colen et al., 2014). Sapsalis et al. (2006) found that self-citations to scientific 
papers on which the inventor collaborated directly increased the forward citation count.  
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Although direct interactions with academics increase the value of industry patents, little is 
known about the role played by the type of governance of these interactions. This might be due 
to difficulties in collecting relevant data. Although secondary data on inventors’ affiliations and 
co-patents and co-publications are readily available, ad hoc surveys are needed to collect 
information on the governance of university-industry interactions. 
It is reasonable to expect that different governance forms of university-industry interactions 
might affect the value of resulting inventions. Different governance forms, in fact, generate 
different incentives for academics and industry scientists to share knowledge, and for academics 
to translate their academic knowledge in order to facilitate its absorption and integration with 
the firm’s existing knowledge base. In the following, we analyze in more detail the theoretical 
links between interaction governance on the one hand, and incentives to share and translate 
knowledge on the other. 
 (i) Incentives to share tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is necessary for the application of 
most codified pieces of knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Cowan et al., 2000; Foss et al., 
2011) including basic scientific research (Mokyr, 1990; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Nelson and 
Rosenberg, 1994). This applies particularly to knowledge that is complex and systemic (Zander 
and Kogut, 1995), where blueprints and manuals only partially help, and the direct involvement 
of the knowledge creator is fundamental to ensure that knowledge is properly understood and 
exploited in order to generate commercializable innovations (Thursby et al., 2001; Agrawal, 
2006; Santoro and Bierly, 2006). At the same time industry researchers’ tacit knowledge is 
crucial for the integration of external knowledge in the firm’s knowledge base (Bierly et al., 
2009). Hence, all else being equal, governance forms that encourage academics and industry 
researchers to share relevant tacit knowledge and enable them to do this effectively, should lead 
to more valuable inventions.  
(ii) Incentives to translate knowledge to promote absorption and integration into the firm’s 
knowledge base. The firm’s ability to absorb external knowledge and integrate it into its 
knowledge base has been studied extensively. The literature suggests that the firm’s absorptive 
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capacity depends to a large extent on its resources and competences (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). In the 
case of university-industry interactions, it has been shown that firms’ engagement in R&D 
(Laursen and Salter, 2004), qualified human resources endowments (Gittelman and Kogut, 
2003), and previous collaboration experience (Bruneel et al., 2010) can reduce the barriers to 
knowledge absorption (Muscio and Pozzali, 2013). However, the academic also plays a role in 
facilitating the firm’s knowledge absorption: the more effort the academic invests in translating 
academic knowledge so that it can be integrated easily in the firm’s knowledge base (Cowan et 
al., 2000), the more effectively this knowledge can be deployed to produce innovations 
(Schofield, 2013). The extent to which academics translate knowledge so that it can be used by 
external collaborators is, at least in part, dependent on the incentives they have for doing so 
(Agrawal, 2006). Hence, all else being equal, forms of governance of university-industry 
interactions that encourage academics to translate academic knowledge for easier integration in 
the firm’s knowledge base, should lead to more valuable inventions.  
Building on these two arguments, we suggest that it is the specific type of formal governance of 
the interaction and not just the presence of a direct interaction, that matters for the value of the 
invention being developed. In particular, governance of the interaction can be unilateral, as in 
the case of personal contracts between a firm and an individual academic, or shared by the 
parties, such as when the relationship between academics and industry personnel is mediated by 
the involvement of the university institution (Oxley, 1997; Geuna and Muscio, 2009; Bodas 
Freitas et al., 2013, 2014).  
 
2.2. The effects of different forms of governance on invention value 
Different forms of governance of the interaction between university and industry generate 
different incentives for sharing and translating knowledge, which affect both the firm’s ability 
to absorb and integrate academic knowledge and the value of the resulting inventions. Different 
governance forms suggest different solutions to the agency problem of motivating individuals 
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so that goals are aligned, and the coordination problem of organizing individuals so that their 
actions are aligned (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000). 
Personal contracts with individual academics  
In the case of personal contracts, the firm contracts an individual academic expert to support 
one of the firm’s projects. The firm organizes and directs the collaboration and is able to fully 
appropriate its results. Governance is unilateral, since the firm coordinates most aspects of the 
collaboration (setting the contractual terms, defining the content of the collaboration, managing 
the resulting intellectual property). Personal contracts with academics are particularly useful for 
small firms with limited resources (Bodas Freitas et al., 2013) since contracting directly with the 
academic entails lower costs than involving the university administration (Bodas Freitas et al., 
2014). The alignment of the academic’s actions to the firm’s objectives is specified in the 
contract; hence, the academic has an incentive to align his or her actions to the firm’s objectives 
to avoid premature termination of the project. Specifically, the academic is motivated to 
translate academic knowledge to allow its easy integration into the firm’s knowledge base, 
which ensures that the firm’s innovation objectives are achieved. These types of contracts can 
include a financial incentive to increase the academic’s knowledge translation effort.  
The unilateral setting of the collaboration’s objectives (which encourages the academic’s 
translation effort) and the unilateral appropriation of intellectual property by the firm (which 
reduces the risk of private knowledge leaking to external actors - Heiman and Nickerson, 2004 - 
and therefore encourages researchers to share their tacit knowledge) facilitate the integration of 
academic knowledge into the firm’s knowledge base. 
However, personal contracts do not solve the agency problem of aligning the academic’s 
intrinsic goals to those of the firm. The academic may be unwilling to exert effort on a project 
that is aimed primarily at achieving the firm’s objectives and distant from his or her academic 
interests, or which might be terminated if it shows signs of not yielding the desired results 
(Lacetera, 2009). The firm needs to monitor the academic’s work to ensure investment of a 
sufficient level of effort (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). Thus, this form of governance is 
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preferred when the academic has an intrinsic reputational incentive to focus on the project, 
which reduces the firm’s monitoring costs. There is empirical evidence showing that firms are 
more likely to stipulate personal contracts with academics who have graduated from the same 
institutions as the firm’s personnel (Bodas Freitas et al., 2014), and therefore have a greater 
intrinsic incentive to commit effort to the collaboration than academics lacking relational 
proximity to the firm’s personnel.  
Contracts stipulated with the university institution 
In the case of contracts stipulated between the firm and the university institution, governance is 
shared by the parties, since the contractual terms, content and objectives of the collaboration, 
and appropriation of its results are subject to negotiation. In particular, the project objectives are 
defined in a negotiated compromise between the university’s and the firm’s interests; these 
objectives have to satisfy the needs of both parties rather than just the firm’s. Institutional 
governance is preferred by large firms and by R&D intensive firms with the internal resources 
required to manage R&D contracts (Bodas Freitas et al., 2013), since these negotiations increase 
the contracting costs. This governance form addresses the agency problem, since the academics 
involved work on the project as employees of the university, which should increase their 
incentives to invest effort in the project (Lacetera, 2009). Working on a project as part of their 
university employment provides reassurance that the collaboration will adhere to the norms and 
standards of the scientific community, and that the project will not be prematurely terminated if 
it does not lead to the desired results. Hence, this form of governance is more likely if the 
parties have no pre-existing social ties with one another: institutional governance has been 
shown to be preferred in situations where the parties are less likely to belong to the same social 
network such as if they are geographically distant (Bodas Freitas et al., 2013). 
However, if it is unclear whether the firm will be able to appropriate all the results of the 
project, the firm will be less likely to share its tacit knowledge. Moreover, the incentives for 
academic knowledge translation might be lower than in the case of personal contractual 
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collaborations, since achieving the project’s objectives may not require the academic to tailor 
his or her knowledge to fit the firm’s goals.  
The differences between the two governance forms and their implications for knowledge 
sharing and translation are summarized in Table I. 
 
Table I. Characteristics of personal and institutional contracts and their implications for 




Personal contracts Institutional contracts Comparison: personal vs. 
institutional 
Setting up and 
organization 
of the project 
Firm hires a scientist as an 
external consultant to work 
on a firm project 
Firm contracts with the 
university for a joint 
project 
Lower contracting costs: 
preferred by less 
resourceful firms  
    
Monitoring of 
effort 
Firm organizes and 
monitors project activities, 
scientist works on the 
project as a self-employed 
external consultant 
Firm and university jointly 
organize and monitor 
project activities, scientist 
works on the project as a 
university employee 
Higher monitoring cost: 
preferred when parties 





Firm decides objectives 
and activities of the project 
Firm agrees on objectives 
and activities that are 
amenable to the university  
Higher risk to the 
academic from not meeting 
firm’s objectives  greater 





Firm fully appropriates the 
results of the project 
Firm negotiates with the 
university the results that 
will be diffused publicly, 
and those that the firm will 
appropriate 
Lower risk for the firm of 
leakage of private 
knowledge  greater 
incentive for tacit 
knowledge sharing 
 
Based on these arguments we can formulate our hypothesis about the impact of different types 
of collaboration governance on the value of the inventions produced by inventors who benefit 
from academic knowledge. The value of collaborative inventions increases with the absorption 
and integration of partners’ knowledge, which is facilitated by greater tacit knowledge sharing 
and knowledge translation efforts. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
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Collaboration with academics based on a personal contract between the inventor’s firm and the 
individual academic results in more valuable inventions than if the collaboration contract is 
between the inventor’s firm and the university institution. 
In addition to the type of governance chosen, the integration of academic knowledge into 
industrial inventions is affected also by individual, firm, and industry specificities. Some 
individual characteristics of inventors increase their ability to absorb and integrate academic 
knowledge into the firm’s knowledge base: we consider in particular the inventors’ ability to 
engage with scientific theories rather than only with applied research outcomes, and their own 
direct experience of performing scientific research. The firm’s engagement in R&D activities is 
known to enhance its absorptive capacity. Industry specificities also matter as the opportunities 
for successful exploitation of scientific research are distributed unequally across technological 
fields. In the following, we briefly discuss each of these factors’ expected influence on 
invention value.   
 Inventors who rely primarily on theoretical scientific knowledge, when interacting with 
academics are more likely to produce more radical inventions, than inventors who rely primarily 
on applied knowledge (Carpenter et al., 1980; Della Malva et al., 2014). This is because 
scientific knowledge helps to guide the inventor through the technological landscape and to 
identify more useful combinations of previously unrelated knowledge domains (Gruber et al., 
2013), and reduces the effort expended on fruitless search (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). Firms 
benefit from scientific knowledge also in order to identify new paths to technological 
development and unlock obsolete technologies (Cassiman et al., 2012). In turn, inventors that 
produce more radical inventions are likely to generate more valuable patents (Nerkar and Shane, 
2007). Radical inventions are likely to find application in a broad range of technological 
domains (Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003), and hence can be exploited 
commercially in a variety of fields (Kotha et al., 2013; Reitzig, 2003). Moreover, radical 
inventions potentially face less competition in the final product market (Sapsalis and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). It can be argued also that inventors who rely on theoretical 
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scientific knowledge are better able to identify and absorb relevant sources of academic 
knowledge than inventors who rely on applied knowledge (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). This 
absorptive capacity allows them to better integrate academic knowledge in the firm’s 
knowledge processes, which leads to more effective translation of research into new 
technologies (Fabrizio, 2009; Cassiman et al., 2008), and potentially to more valuable 
inventions.  
Inventors’ absorptive capacity is related to other individual features including active personal 
engagement in scientific research. Boundary spanning inventors with strong personal 
connections to scientific research through co-authorship with university scientists (Cockburn 
and Henderson, 1998), collaboration with university institutions (Cassiman et al., 2012), or 
previous employment in a university institution (Gittelman, 2005; Bjerregaard, 2010) can 
facilitate the transformation of academic knowledge into valuable inventions. The capacity to 
absorb university knowledge may also increase with education and more experience of 
interacting with cognitively distant collaborators as a result of higher career mobility.  
The firm’s general context influences inventors’ ability to exploit academic knowledge. In 
particular, the firm’s engagement in R&D activities (especially when aimed at technological 
recombination; Soh and Subramanian, 2014) is an important predictor of the ability to exploit 
academic knowledge (Laursen and Salter, 2004). It is important to control also for technological 
specificities. The opportunities for successful exploitation of scientific research are concentrated 
in certain technological fields such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, information and 
communication technology, and nanotechnology (Callaert et al., 2006). Firms that innovate in 
these fields are more likely to benefit from academic research to produce valuable inventions 




3. Research design 
3.1. Industry inventors in Piedmont: the PIEMINV survey 
Piedmont is one of the most technologically advanced regions in Italy with much higher 
investment in R&D compared to the rest of Italy (Bodas Freitas et al., 2013), and scientific and 
technological performance in line with the EU average (European Commission, 2014). The 
region has an important manufacturing base with a relevant presence in R&D-intensive 
industries such as automotive, aeronautics and aerospace, and telecommunications, and in 
traditional industries such as food and fashion. It hosts three important universities, two of 
which are in Torino, the region’s largest city. The University of Torino is one of the oldest 
Italian universities, and is a large (ca. 63,000 students) multidisciplinary institution. The 
Politecnico of Torino has almost 29,000 students and is one of the three elite technical 
universities in Italy. The more recently (1998) established University of Piemonte Orientale is a 
smaller university (almost 10,000 students) with campuses in three small towns in the region. 
These characteristics make Piedmont a relevant case to explore how the governance of 
university-industry interactions contributes to the value of industrial inventions.  
The PIEMINV survey was targeted at the population of inventors named on at least one 
European Patent Office (EPO) patent application between 1998 and 2005, resident in Piedmont, 
and resulted in 938 valid responses (31% response rate).1 The questionnaire was designed to 
investigate various aspects of university-industry interactions, and to enable quantitative 
measurement of the universities’ contribution to the invention process. The questionnaire 
included four sections; in this paper we focus on the information derived from the responses to 
section four, which focused on assessment of the economic impact of university knowledge. It 
asked for details of two specific inventions: the one that had benefited most from academic 
knowledge, and the inventor’s most valuable invention. We limited our questions related to 
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for a short methodological description of the survey. For a detailed analysis of the 
PIEMINV survey see Cecchelli et al. (2012).  
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value information to two inventions in order to maximize the response rate (see section 3.2 for a 
detailed explanation of our invention value measure). To our knowledge, PIEMINV is the first 
survey to collect such information, and to distinguish among two different contractual 
governance forms in relation to the value of the inventions.  
Twenty-three inventors were removed from the database because they were employed by a 
public institution (university, public research organization, government agency) at the time of 
patent filing, leaving a total of 915 industry inventors. Additional information on inventor’s 
employer (number of employees, revenue, head office location, number of branches, year of 
foundation, sector, legal status, industry) was collected from the CERVED database of Italian 
companies’ accounts, and other public online sources. Of the 363 firms in the sample, this 
information was available for 298 (corresponding to 738 inventors); for non-public small and 
micro firms some information was missing. We collected the number of patents filed by the 
inventor’s firm from 1998 to 2005, from the Derwent Innovations Index. For each inventor we 
collected the number of patent applications and the number of patents granted between 1998 
and 2005, the most common type of assignee, the average number of backward citations, the 
average number of forward citations, the average number of citations to academic papers, the 
date of first patent application, and the most frequent technology class.2  
The mean age of the sample is 48.1 years, with most in the 41-50 cohort (36.7%). The mean age 
is lower for women (41.6 years) who constitute 8.2% of the sample.3 Younger inventors are 
more highly educated on average: 76.8% of under-40s have a tertiary degree (sample average 
59%), and 5.6% have a PhD (sample average 3.8%). Inventors are characterized by low levels 
of education and career mobility: 79.5% completed their primary and secondary education 
locally, and 31.5% had worked for only one organization; 60.7% had worked for less than five 
                                                 
2 Classification by macro-technology classes is according to OST-DT7 (OST, 2004). 
3 The share of women in the PIEMINV survey is higher than the Italian (2.7%) and the European (2.8%) 
shares, reported by the PatVal survey (Giuri et al., 2007).  
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different organizations, and only 7.8% had had more than five different employers. Mobility is 
correlated to education attainment: more highly educated inventors are more mobile.  
Most (60.8%) inventors work in large firms (more than 250 employees), in five manufacturing 
sectors: fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment); computers, electronic and 
optical products; electrical equipment; machinery and equipment n.e.c.; motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers.  
Almost two-thirds of inventors have patented less than five inventions; the average is 1-2 
patented inventions each. Only 8% have more than 16 patented inventions. The average number 
of non-patented inventions is almost double the number of patented inventions (ca. 3-5 non-
patented inventions), in line with evidence for other regions and countries (Acs and Audretsch, 
1988; Arundel and Kabla, 1998).  
After a first cleaning of the original dataset for missing observations, incomplete answers, and 
missing information on inventor’s employing firm, we were left with a sample of 657 
observations including inventors who collaborated with a university and benefited from 
academic knowledge, and inventors who did not declare any substantial contribution from 
academic knowledge.4  
 
3.2. Constructing a measure of invention value 
As discussed previously, the literature investigating the impact of academic knowledge on 
patent value tends to measure it using forward citations counts. Forward citations are easy to 
retrieve from patent databases but suffer from several limitations (van Zeebroeck, 2011; 
Squicciarini et al., 2013) including differences in citation standards across classes. Also, the 
                                                 
4 The 657 inventors that accounted for complete questionnaires and are used for the empirical analysis, 
are not significantly different from the overall sample of 915 respondents. Mean age is 48.5 years, and the 
share of women is 7.3%; 58% of inventors have a tertiary degree or a PhD and 8.7% have experience of 




number of forward citations can indicate a “crowded” research field rather than patent quality 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Other proxies for the economic value of patents include patent 
opposition and renewal data (where patent value is captured by the extent to which companies 
are willing to spend resources on litigation or patent renewal; Priest and Klein, 1984; Pakes and 
Simpson, 1989; Bebchuk, 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Arts and Fleming, 2018), 
patent claims, the extent of the protection sought in a patent application (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Beaudry and Kananian, 2013), company start-up activity (capturing 
whether the patent led to the creation of a high-tech start-up; Shane, 2001), probability of a 
patent being granted (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000), and composite 
indicators (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; van Zeebroeck, 2011).  
None of these variables measures economic value directly, and all are poorly correlated, 
suggesting that they capture different aspects of patent importance or patent quality.5 A few 
survey-based studies asked respondents to provide estimates of the monetary value of their 
patents (Harhoff et al., 1999; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; Reitzig, 2003; Gambardella et al., 
2008). This approach has shortcomings related mainly to data accuracy and reliability, since 
estimating the commercial value of a patent is difficult, especially for the large share of patents 
that are not traded but are used internally or strategically (e.g. blocking patents). The survey 
design might have to accept a trade-off in the link between patent value and features of the 
invention process. Inventors may not have details about patent value since this information 
often is reserved to product/R&D managers and executives (Mansfield, 1991). However, they 
are better able to answer questions about the invention process.  
We propose a new measure of patent value that accounts for some of the limitations of survey-
based approaches. Section IV (assessment of the economic impact of university knowledge) of 
                                                 
5 In a recent study analyzing how well several proxies for the economic value of patents perform in 
predicting actual economic value, Capponi et al. (2017) find that the number of claims appears poorly 
correlated with economic value, while forward citations, and especially family size and number of 
renewals, perform better (a result consistent with Harhoff et al., 1999), although still not well; the best 




the PIEMINV survey asked inventors to identify and provide information on two specific 
(patented or not) inventions: the invention that benefited the most from university knowledge,6 
and the invention that had the highest economic impact. For each invention, respondents were 
asked to provide information on its monetary value (€’000 at current prices). 7  Among the 
sample of inventors with two or more patented inventions, 164 (24.9%) stated that at least some 
of their inventions had benefited from university knowledge, and provided information on two 
inventions. 
Since the inventor might find it difficult to estimate the exact value of an invention, with some 
overestimating it and others underestimating it, we do not use absolute economic value but 
construct two relative measures. First, we count how many inventors stated that the invention 
that had benefited most from academic knowledge was also the invention that had had the 
highest economic impact. Highest_economic_impact is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the inventions coincide: 53 out of 164 respondents (32.3%) stated that the invention that had 
received the greatest contribution from academic knowledge was also their most valuable 
invention, suggesting an important role of academic knowledge in the process of value creation.  
We also calculated the ratio between the value of the invention with the highest contribution 
from academic knowledge, and the value of the invention with the highest economic impact. 
This variable, Relative_economic_value, takes values between zero and 1. Using a relative 
measure of invention value overcomes the problem of lack of comparability across inventors, 
since it requires only the assumption that each inventor’s evaluations are consistent. This ratio 
also eliminates unit of measurement problems (common to this type of question), and regardless 
of the subjective and heterogeneous measures used by inventors, provides an indication of the 
value of the invention that benefited most from academic knowledge with respect to the most 
                                                 
6 About 85% of inventions that had benefited greatly from academic knowledge had been patented. 
7 The question was based on Gambardella et al. (2008) and was worded as follows: “Suppose that, on the 
day that the invention was completed (or, if the invention was patented, on the day that the patent was 
granted) a potential competitor had expressed an interested in purchasing it, what is the minimum price 
that the invention’s owner would have asked for it?” 
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valuable invention in the inventor’s portfolio. The value of the invention with the highest 
economic impact also allows us to net out from our estimates the intrinsic quality of inventors 
which clearly is correlated to the value of their invention. 
The variables Highest_economic_impact and Relative_economic_value are our main dependent 
variables. Table II shows that Relative_economic_value has fewer observations than the binary 
variable Highest_economic_impact, since not all the inventors who identified the two inventions 
were able or willing to provide specific monetary values.8 Figure 1 plots the distribution of the 
(logs of) the values of the invention with the highest academic contribution. As expected, the 
distribution is extremely skewed and displays a large range of values, in line with the findings 
in the patent value literature.9 
Focusing only on the inventions with the highest contribution from academic knowledge, and 
assessing their value compared to the most valuable inventions has some limitations. It reduces 
the validity of our measures capturing the most important impact and may not be representative 
of the whole spectrum of the contribution of academic knowledge to all the inventive activities 
of firm inventors. However, the literature suggests that the value of patents is highly skewed, 
with a very small number of patents related to important innovations with high economic value, 
                                                 
8 Among the 164 inventors who provided information on two inventions, 77 did not provide an economic 
value for one or both inventions. In those cases we cannot calculate the Relative_economic_value 
variable. Among these 77 individuals, 54 had Highest_economic_impact =0 and 23 had 
Highest_economic_impact =1. This means that in this restricted subsample of excluded inventors the 
share of Highest_economic_impact =1 is 30%, which is in line with the overall average of 32% (53 
inventors over 164, see Figure 1). Therefore, we believe that the inventors for whom we cannot compute 
Relative_economic_value represent a fairly random subsample of respondents. 
9 We modeled invention value using the number of forward citations to the patented invention. However, 
not all inventors provided the specific identifier for their invention, which reduced the number of 
observations for the empirical analysis. Pairwise correlation shows that our measures of invention value 
are weakly correlated to the patent based measures, making the impact of governance type less clear cut 
when forward citations is the dependent variable. This is due, first, to the fact that studies that use forward 
citations especially in the context of university-industry collaboration, often focus on science-based 
disciplines, while our inventors work in the fields of mechanical engineering (30% of the 164 inventors) 
and electronics (29%). This means that forward citations in our case, are less strictly linked to economic 
value. Second, we interpret these findings as confirmation that forward citations are good proxies for the 
invention’s technological relevance, but may not be correlated to the invention’s economic value to the 
firm that introduced it. Thus, we suggest that the form of governance will affect the firm’s ability to 
benefit from the invention, but do not hypothesize about the impact of governance type on its contribution 
to later inventions (possibly by other firms). 
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and a large number of patents that are never exploited. Therefore, our measures should identify 
innovations with significant economic impact. 
 







Economic value of 
inventions with highest 
contribution from 
university knowledge 
Economic value of 
inventions with highest 
economic impact 
Observations 164 87 87 87 
Mean 0.304 0.53 2,158,749 6,044,990 
St. deviation 0.461 0.43 7,741,929 24,700,000 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 50,000,000 200,000,000 
Skewness 0.85 -0.05 5.55 6.51 
Kurtosis 1.71 1.26 34.35                48.3 
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We want to explain the factors correlated to the value of those inventions with an important 
contribution from academic knowledge relative to the most valuable invention in the inventor’s 
portfolio. We are interested in the governance of the university-industry interaction, and control 
for inventor characteristics and several firm and industry specificities. We propose the following 
linear model: 








å + vi   (1) 
where yi is a proxy for the value of inventor i’s invention which benefited most from the 
contribution of academic knowledge, relative to the inventor’s most valuable invention; GOV is 
a set of variables capturing the governance of the interactions between university and industry; 
INV is a set of variables capturing some inventor characteristics; FIRM and TECH are sets of 
firm and technological control variables; and vi is an idiosyncratic error term. 
In estimating equation (1) we are aware of the risk of selection bias. Only those inventors who 
said they had benefited from academic knowledge were able to assess its contribution to the 
value of their inventions. Hence, we need first to control for whether this subset of inventors is 
significantly different from the rest of the sample. Also, some of the factors influencing the 
value of the academic knowledge contribution are likely to influence the probability of having 
benefited from it. To avoid underestimation of these variables, we estimate a selection equation 
that indicates whether inventors were able to benefit from academic knowledge, and an intensity 
equation to measure the effect of different variables on the relative economic value of those 
inventions that benefited from academic knowledge. 
Our preferred selection variable (Contribution) is a dummy that is equal to 1 if at least some of 
the inventor’s inventions benefited greatly from academic knowledge.10 However, to check the 
                                                 
10 This variable is based on inventors’ answers to the following question: “How many of your inventions 
benefited from an important contribution from academic knowledge? By “contribution” we mean any 




robustness of our findings we use the alternative selection variable Cooperation which is equal 
to 1 if the inventor had experience of cooperation with a university institution or an individual 
university scientist.11 This variable is used in several studies to analyze university-industry 
relationships. We prefer the selection variable Contribution because we believe it is a better 
measure of the inventors’ individual ability to benefit from academic knowledge. In the 
selection equation we are interested in understanding the factors that allow inventors 
successfully to exploit academic knowledge, while cooperating or not with a university is 
influenced mainly by the characteristics of the firm employing the inventor (e.g. large firms 
cooperate more). In the empirical analysis we use two specifications of the model: when the 
dependent variable y is the binary variable Highest_economic_impact, we estimate a probit 
model with sample selection, when the dependent variable is the continuous variable 
Relative_economic_value we estimate a Tobit type II model (Amemiya, 1984).  
 
Personal contractual collaborations: instrumental variables strategy 
A problem in estimating equation (1) is that the (unobserved and idiosyncratic) quality of an 
invention might be correlated to both invention value and the specific form of governance of the 
university-industry interactions. That is, in the case of projects that can potentially generate 
higher (unobserved) quality inventions, and therefore, higher expected economic value, firms 
might prefer personal contracts, since the property rights to those inventions would be assigned 
directly to the firm (Bodas Freitas et al., 2014). This results in a typical problem of reverse 
causality, which would bias estimates of the treatment (personal contracts) on the value of the 
invention. To overcome this, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, using as 
instruments three variables which are likely to be correlated to the choice to govern the 
                                                                                                                                               
instrumental in realizing the invention”. The possible answers were: None, less than half, more than half, 
All. Contribution is equal to 1 if at least “less than a half” was selected by the respondents. 
11 The specific question in the PIEMINV survey is: “Have you any experience of collaboration with a 
university or contracts with individual university employees? (Yes / No)” 
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interaction by a personal contract but which are not correlated to the specific value of the 
invention considered.  
We know that the choice of personal contracts is influenced by various factors (Bodas Freitas et 
al., 2014); however, our exclusion restriction relies on the fact that these factors are unlikely to 
affect the value of the invention. In particular, relational proximity between the industry 
inventor and the academic facilitates the choice of a personal contract as the preferred means to 
access university knowledge.  
We use a set of instruments to capture this relational proximity. The first is the variable, Local, 
which is equal to 1 if the inventor’s highest education attainment is secondary school level, in 
the region. Among inventors without university education, having been educated to secondary 
level in the region in which they are working, increases their likelihood of belonging to the 
same social networks as academics working in the that region who, given the low level of 
mobility in the region, are likely also to have been educated there.   
Collaborating with the university from which the inventor graduated (alumni interactions) also 
increases the probability of using personal contracts (Bodas Freitas et al., 2014). Again, it is 
likely that the inventors will have greater relational proximity to university researchers in their 
alma mater. We built a variable, Alumni_polito, which is equal to 1 if the inventor graduated 
from the Politecnico di Torino and declares frequent professional interactions with the 
institution. The model estimation includes a series of robustness checks to confirm the 
endogeneity of these instruments.  
The PIEMINV survey asked inventors with which universities they had personal contractual 
collaborations. The geographic pattern of these collaborations shows that there is frequent 
collaboration with scientists in Italian universities outside of Piedmont. We believe this is 
determined by the alumni connections of inventors who graduated from universities outside 
Piedmont, or the existence of professional networks built over the course of the inventor’s 
career which allow privileged personal interactions with individual academics in other Italian 
regions. Data on inventors’ scientific publications (extracted from Scopus) were used to build a 
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third IV, Share Italy, which measures the share of Italian co-authors from outside of Piedmont 
in the inventor’s total number of co-authors. The share of Italian co-authors not resident in 
Piedmont proxies for the importance of the inventors’ social networks outside of Piedmont 
which are also likely to lead to personal collaborations.  
We adopt an over-identified IV strategy with three instruments for one endogenous variable. 
Following Angrist (2001), we adopt a linear probability model in order to focus explicitly on 
identifying the causal effect of treatment on the treated: we use two stage least squares (2SLS) 
to estimate equation (1). 
 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
3.4.1. The selection equation 
In the selection equation we use a set of independent variables that are identified in the literature 
as likely to influence the probability that an inventor collaborated with an academic in the 
development of his or her invention. Table III indicates how we construct each variable, and 
table IV reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the first stage selection 
equation for 657 observations.  
 
Inventor characteristics 
We control for the personal characteristics of inventors that might facilitate collaboration with 
an academic. More highly educated inventors (HEducation captures whether the inventor has a 
bachelors, masters, or doctoral degree) and inventors with experience of working in a university 
(University Work Experience) might be more inclined to consult a source of university 
knowledge, and might be better able to understand the scientific literature and communicate 
with academics. More productive inventors (Technological Productivity, defined as the number 
of patent applications to the EPO in the period 1998-2005) may be more experienced and also 
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Several firm characteristics might affect the probability of interacting with a university. The 
literature shows that larger and R&D-intensive firms are more likely to interact with 
universities. Therefore, we consider a set of firm size dummies: micro-firms (less than 10 
employees) and individual inventors; small and medium sized firms (10-250 employees); large 
firms (more than 250 employees). Table IV shows that the majority (68%) of inventors work in 
large firms, with the remaining 32% distributed fairly evenly between micro and small and 
medium sized firms. We control also for each firm’s R&D activity; Technological capability 
measures the number of EPO patents granted in the period 1998 to 2005 at the firm level. The 
average number of patents per firm is 262, with large firms accounting for around 2,000 patents 
and some firms registering zero patents in the time window. We include a dummy for whether 
the firm’s ownership is not Italian (Foreign firms); some 10% of firms are foreign-owned.12  
Finally, we include several dummies to capture the most common technology class in the 
inventor’s portfolio among electrical engineering and electronics, process engineering, 
instruments, chemicals, pharmaceutical, mechanical engineering, and consumer goods. 
Compared to economic activity codes, these variables more precisely capture the inventor’s 
technology specialism, and especially in the case of large multiproduct firms where industry 
affiliation might be too generic.13 Table IV shows that electrical engineering and mechanical 
                                                 
12 These are either Italian subsidiaries of foreign firms, or are headquartered just across Italian border, e.g. 
some Swiss firms are located close to the Italian border. Since the PIEMINV survey targeted inventors 
resident in the Piedmont region, the sample does not include inventors working for foreign firms located 
at a distance from the Italian border. 
13  Two inventors working, for example, in the same large automotive firm might be specialized in 
different technological fields (e.g. electronics and mechanical engineering). Use of a sectoral dummy 




engineering are the most common technology classes indicated by inventors. This is consistent 
with the regional industry specialization, and distinguishes the present study from most previous 
work that focuses on the biomedical and pharmaceutical industries. 
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Table III. Description of variables. 
Variable Description 
Selection equation  Dependent variables 
Contribution Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least some of the inventor’s inventions received 
important contributions from academic knowledge 
Cooperation Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor has had experience of 
cooperation with a university institution or an individual university 
scientist 
Main equation  Dependent variables 
Highest economic 
impact 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventors stated that their invention that had benefited 
most from academic knowledge coincided with the invention that had the highest 
economic impact.  
Relative economic 
value 
Ratio between the value of the invention with the highest contribution from academic 
knowledge, and the value of the invention with the highest economic impact.  
 Independent variables 
Collaboration Dummy variable equal to 1 if the development of the invention with the highest 
academic knowledge contribution involved any form of contract-based collaboration 
with university scientists 
Pcontracts Dummy variable equal to 1 if the development of the invention with the highest 
academic knowledge contribution involved a personal contract signed directly by the 
academic researcher involved. 
Institutional Dummy variable equal to 1 if the development of the invention with the highest 
academic knowledge contribution involved a contract signed by the university 
administration 
Theories Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor indicated “scientific theorems and principles” 
as the most useful type of academic knowledge for the development of his/her 
inventions.  
Methods Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor indicated “methodologies, techniques, and 
instruments” as the most useful type of academic knowledge for the development of 
his/her inventions.  
Applied Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor indicated “solutions to technological 
problems/support for prototyping” as the most useful type of academic knowledge for 
the development of his/her inventions.  
Contact Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor indicated “information about other relevant 
sources of knowledge/about other organisations” as the most useful type of academic 
knowledge for the development of his/her inventions.  
 Individual Characteristics 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor is a man 
Age Age of the inventor in 2009 
HEducation Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor has a bachelors, masters, or doctoral degree 
University work 
experience 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor has experience of working in a university 
Publications total number of the inventor’s scientific publications in the Scopus database. 
Academic co-
publications 
Total number of the inventor’s publications in the Scopus database which involved a co-
authorship with an author with an academic affiliation. 
Technological 
productivity 
number of the inventor’s patent applications to the EPO in the period 1998-2005 
Firm Characteristics  
Micro firms Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor works in a firm with less than 10 employees 
Small and Medium 
Firms 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor works in a firm with between 10 and 250 
employees 
Large Firms Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor works in a firm with more than 250 
employees 
Foreign Firms Dummy variable equal to 1 if ownership of the inventor’s firm is not Italian 
Technological 
capability 
Number of EPO patents (in 000s) granted in the period 1998 to 2005 at the firm in which 
the inventor is employed 
Instruments  
Local Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor’s highest educational attainment is a 
secondary degree earned in the Piedmont region. 
Alumni_polito Dummy variable equal to 1 if the inventor graduated from the Politecnico di Torino, and 
claims to have frequent professional interactions with that institution. 





Table IV. Descriptive statistics. All inventors 













Cooperation 657 0.452 0.498 0 1 
      
Individual Characteristics      
Male 657 0.927 0.260 0 1 
Age 657 48.521 9.940 30 88 
HEducation 657 0.583 0.493 0 1 
University work experience 657 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Technological productivity 657 2.213 2.498 0 24 
      
Firm Characteristics      
Micro firms 657 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Small and Medium Firms 657 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Large Firms 657 0.683 0.466 0 1 
Foreign Firms 657 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Technological capability 657 262.938 511.852 0 4808 
      
Technological dummies      
Electrical engineering 657 0.251 0.434 0 1 
Instruments 657 0.100 0.301 0 1 
Chemicals 657 0.065 0.248 0 1 
Pharmaceuticals 657 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Process Engineering 657 0.131 0.338 0 1 
Mechanical Engineering 657 0.368 0.483 0 1 
Consumer goods 657 0.070 0.255 0 1 
 
3.4.2. The main equation 
The following independent variables are used in the main equation (table V reports the 
descriptive statistics relating to the variables used in the main equation for 164 observations, 
which are a subset of the 657 observations used in the selection equation). 
Governance 
Collaboration indicates whether the development of the invention with the highest academic 
knowledge contribution involved any form of contract-based collaboration with a university 
scientist. To test our hypothesis, we contrast two types of governance of collaborations: 
personal contracts signed directly by the academic (PContract) or contracts stipulated with the 
university institution (Institutional). Table V shows that 23.2% of the inventions with the 
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highest contribution from academic knowledge involved personal contracts with individual 
scientists, and 28.7% involved contracts with the institution. The pairwise correlation in 
Appendix table B1 shows that the two types of governance are negatively correlated, suggesting 
that inventors do not use them simultaneously. Table A1 in Appendix A shows the specific 
question of the questionnaire used to build our governance measures. Since we were mainly 
interested in contrasting these two types of formal governance, the question did not explore the 
full spectrum of interactions (different from research contracts) that inventors might have had 
with academics in the course of the development of the invention.14 Hence, the inventors might 
have engaged also in specific kinds of non-contractual interactions in parallel with, or in place 
of, contractual interactions during the development of the invention.   
Inventor characteristics 
We control for several inventor characteristics. To capture inventor’s reliance on different types 
of academic knowledge, we include four dummy variables for scientific theorems and principles 
(Theories), methodologies, techniques, and instruments (Methods), solutions to technological 
problems/support for prototyping (Applied), and information on other relevant sources of 
knowledge/ other organizations (Contact). Our 164 respondents exploit academic knowledge 
mainly to obtain information about other relevant sources of knowledge (59.8%), and to find 
solutions to technological problems (61.0%); theoretical knowledge was declared important by 
54.9%, and methodologies, techniques, and instruments by 50.6%. To capture an inventor’s 
personal engagement in science, we use their total number of scientific publications in the 
Scopus database (Publications). We control also for inventor’s age (and age squared) and 
gender.  Finally, we use the same firm and technology controls as in the selection equation.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 Among the non-research contract types of interactions we included the supervision of master or 
PhD students, as well as the sharing of facilities, such as labs or equipment.  
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Table V. Descriptive statistics, restricted sample  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Governance       
Collaboration 164 0.488 0.501 0 1 
Pcontracts 164 0.232 0.423 0 1 
Institutional 164 0.287 0.454 0 1 
      
Types of university knowledge      
Theories 164 0.549 0.499 0 1 
Methods 164 0.506 0.501 0 1 
Applied 164 0.610 0.489 0 1 
Contact 164 0.598 0.492 0 1 
      
Individual Characteristics      
Male 164 0.909 0.289 0 1 
Age 164 48.5 10.573 31 88 
HEducation 164 0.793 0.407 0 1 
University work experience 164 0.183 0.388 0 1 
Publications 164 5.859 15.168 0 144 
Academic co-publications 164 2.500 6.530 0 46 
Technological productivity 164 2.665 3.203 0 24 
      
Firms Characteristics      
Micro firms 164 0.085 0.280 0 1 
Small and Medium Firms 164 0.165 0.372 0 1 
Large Firms 164 0.750 0.434 0 1 
Technological capability 164 296 565.504 0 2869 
      
Technological dummies      
Electrical engineering 164 0.287 0.454 0 1 
Instruments 164 0.146 0.355 0 1 
Chemicals 164 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Pharmaceuticals 164 0.024 0.155 0 1 
Process Engineering 164 0.091 0.289 0 1 
Mechanical Engineering 164 0.311 0.464 0 1 
Consumer Goods 164 0.037 0.188 0 1 
      
Instruments      
Local 164 0.030 0.172 0 1 
Alumni_polito 164 0.103 0.305 0 1 








Table VI presents the results of the selection models using the two selection variables already 
described, to examine the characteristics of inventors able to benefit from academic knowledge 
or to collaborate actively with an academic institution.   
Column (1) presents the results of a probit regression with the dependent variable 
Contribution:15 it shows a positive and significant effect of higher education (HEducation), of 
having spent at least one month working at a university (University Work Experience), and of 
the number of patent applications to the EPO in the period 1998-2005 (Technological 
Productivity). Firm size dummies are not significant, suggesting that there are no substantial 
differences among small and large firms in relation to the ability of their inventors to obtain 
important contributions from academic knowledge. Also, the firm level variable Technological 
capability is not significant, indicating that inventor’s individual characteristics are a better 
predictor than firm characteristics of the capability to develop a contribution based on academic 
knowledge. Although not reported in the table, some of the technology class dummies are 
significant, confirming the existence of relevant differences across technologies. 
In table VI column (2) the dependent variable is the probability of having collaborated with a 
university (Cooperation). The results are similar to those from the previous estimation, although 
the coefficients of firm size are different. In line with the literature on university-industry 
interaction, if the probability to cooperate is the dependent variable, large firms have a positive 
and significant coefficient.  
Given the similarity of the results across specifications we prefer to use Contribution as our 




                                                 
15 We also modeled Contribution as an ordinal variable following the formulation of the survey question. 
In this estimation, the coefficients of age and age squared are significant, suggesting the existence of a U-
shaped relationship between age and the ability to benefit from university knowledge. 




Table VI. Selection equations 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Contribution  Cooperation 
      
Inventor chracterisitcs   
HEducation 0.183*** 0.305*** 
 (0.035) (0.042) 
University Work Experience 0.231*** 0.247*** 
 (0.073) (0.077) 
Age -0.022 0.035* 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
Age^2 0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Technological Productivity 0.013* 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
Male 0.045 -0.081 
 (0.056) (0.080) 
Firm characteristics   
Small and Medium Firms -0.077 0.156* 
 (0.059) (0.091) 
Large Firms 0.009 0.246*** 
 (0.060) (0.076) 
Foreign  -0.026 -0.013 
 (0.054) (0.071) 
Technological capability -0.024 0.036 
 (0.035) (0.047) 
Technological dummies yes yes 
   
Observations 657 657 
pseudo-Rsquared 0.105 0.165 
Log-likelihood -330.3 -377.6 
Reported coefficients are marginal effects (at the sample means) from a probit. The reference category for the size 
dummies are micro-companies and individual inventors. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VII, columns (1) and (2) presents the results for the value equation (1), correcting for 
selection bias using the equation in Table VI. We start by using Highest_economic_impact as 
our dependent variable, and opt for a probit model, Column (1) reports the marginal effects 
relative to the value equation. The coefficient of Collaboration, which indicates whether the 
invention involved collaboration with a university, is positive but not significant. Column (2) 
distinguishes between personal contracts with an academic (PContract) and institutional 
contracts (Institutional): the coefficient of the former is bigger than the coefficient of the latter; 
however, in both cases the coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  
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Table VII column (3) presents the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations with 
personal contracts (PContract) instrumented by the three variables described in section 3.3. The 
2SLS estimations do not account for selection bias. Our choice to use 2SLS is supported by the 
fact that in Table VII columns (1) and (2) the rho coefficient indicates lack of selection bias in 
the estimation of equation (1). The under-identification test of the first stage statistics shows 
that the excluded instruments are relevant, as shown also by the positive and significant 
coefficients of the first stage. In addition, the Hansen test suggests that the model is correctly 
identified, and the excluded instruments are not correlated to the error term.17 
 
Finally, the 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) test for weak instruments rejects the hypothesis of weak 
instruments. Here, Pcontract remains positive and its coefficient increases in size and becomes 
significant. The Wald test confirms that the coefficient of Pcontract is significantly larger than 
the coefficient of Institutional. The 2SLS estimates can be interpreted in terms of local average 
treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994): the increase in the size of the coefficient indicates 
that for the subsample of inventors whose treatment status is affected by the instruments, the 
effect of personal contracts is substantially greater than for the whole sample. In other words, 
using personal contracts leads to high value inventions especially when inventors choose them 
based on their relational proximity to academic researchers.18  
 
                                                 
17 The validity of our IV estimates might be affected by the fact that having a technical education might 
be positively correlated to the value of the inventor’s invention as in Toivanen and Vänänen (2016) for a 
large sample of Finnish inventors. If this is the case, alumni_polito may not be exogenous to the value of 
the invention. To check this we performed a difference-in-Sargan statistic which allows us to test a subset 
of the orthogonality conditions for specific regressors. The value of this test, performed specifically to 
check the exogeneity of alumni_polito, is 0.032 with a p-value of 0.857 which generally confirms the 
null-hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument. We interpret this as confirmation that in our sample 
inventor’s technical education does not substantially affect the value of his or her invention. 
18  Only 3% of cases (5 out of 164) involved both governance types used jointly. As an additional 
robustness check we ran our models excluding those 5 inventors: the results of the estimation did not 




Table VII. Probit and IV on Highest_economic_impact  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit with sample 
selection 
Probit with sample 
selection 
IV-2SLS 





 (0.083)   
Pcontracts  0.151 0.593* 
  (0.098) (0.309) 
Institutional  0.023 0.097 
  (0.094) (0.102) 
Inventor Characteristics 
Theories 0.167* 0.167* 0.152* 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.083) 
Methods -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.070) 
Applied -0.107 -0.107 -0.074 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.091) 
Contact 0.075 0.068 0.060 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.085) 
Age -0.059** -0.054** -0.056** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) 
Age^2 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publications -0.006 -0.006 -0.003* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Male -0.090 -0.105 -0.139 
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.152) 
Firm Characteristics    
Small and Medium Firms 0.016 -0.003 -0.071 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.179) 
Large Firms -0.140 -0.144 -0.231 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.166) 
Technological capability 0.146** 0.142** 0.121* 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.065) 
Technological dummies yes yes yes 
First stage    
Local   0.465** 
   (0.199) 
Alumni_polito   0.237* 
   (0.122) 
Share Italy   0.319** 
      (0.153) 
Wald test Pcontracts = Institutional 1.10 3.54 
p-value 0.294 0.060 
Underid. test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):                9.097 
p-value   0.028 
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments:  4.04 
Prob>F   0.008 
Hansen J statistic (overid. test of all instruments):           0.075 
 χ2 P-value       0.963 
athanrho -0.166 -0.139 - 
 (0.411) (0.402) - 
Observations 657 657 164 
Uncensored obs. 164 164 - 
Equations in columns (1) and (2) are estimated with a probit model with sample selection. The reference 
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category for the size dummies are micro companies and individual inventors. In columns (1) and (2) marginal 
effects (at the sample mean) are displayed. In column (3) the coefficients of a 2SLS instrumental variable 
estimation are displayed, first stage coefficients are reported. All models include OST7-based technological 
dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Among the control variables, the coefficient of Theories, which indicates that inventors use 
university knowledge in order to access scientific theorems and principles, is positive and 
significant. The coefficients of the other types of knowledge are not significant. The age 
variable and its squared term indicate a U-shaped relationship between age and the probability 
of achieving an economically valuable invention that has benefited from academic knowledge. 
More specifically, given the coefficients of age of -0.059 and of age squared of 0.001, we find 
that after 29.5 years of age the effect of age becomes positive, and increasingly more positive as 
age increases. The coefficient of Publications is negative, showing that higher levels of inventor 
engagement with scientific research do not increase the relative value of inventions with a high 
contribution of university knowledge. Firm size and especially large size, has a negative but not 
significant coefficient, while the coefficient of firm’s technological capability is positive and 
significant, indicating that inventors working for R&D-active firms are more able to exploit 
university knowledge to create economic value. The model includes technology dummies (not 
reported in the tables), which are never significant.  
Table VIII presents the results of a Tobit type II model (Amemiya, 1984) where the variable 
Relative_economic_value is the dependent variable in the value equation (the selection equation 
is reported in Appendix B). Table VIII column (1) shows that Collaboration is positive but not 
significant. Column (2) distinguishes between the two governance forms for collaboration; only 
personal contractual collaboration with an individual scientist (PContract) is positively (and 
significantly) correlated to the relative value of the invention with the highest contribution of 
academic knowledge, while institutional collaboration (Institutional) is negative but not 
significant. The Wald test on the difference between the two coefficients (at the bottom of table 
VIII) confirms that the coefficient of PContract is significantly larger than the coefficient of 
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Insitutional.19  The rho coefficient is always positive and significant, meaning that for this 
specification we need the selection equation. Table VIII columns (3) and (4) present the results 
of the 2SLS estimation of equation (1) with Relative_economic_value as the dependent variable. 
Again, the results show that PContract is positive and significant when instrumented (and 
significantly different from the coefficient of Institutional). The first stage statistics with 
Relative_economic_value as the dependent variable show that while Local remains strongly 
relevant, the other two instruments lose most of their significance: this results in lower F-
statistics and a potential problem of weak instruments. This is because using 
Relative_economic_value reduces the number of observations, and these missing observations 
are likely to include inventors whose treatment status is changed by the other two instruments 
(alumni effect and professional networks outside the region). The only instrument in column (4) 
is Local: the results do not change and we find that in this new specification the instrument is no 
longer weak, as shown by the F-statistic. 
In this specification, the coefficients of Theory and of firm’s Technological capability remain 
positive and significant. We find also that the coefficient of large firms is negative and 
significant, similar to the results in table VII. This negative effect of large firms is because they 
rely mostly on internal resources to innovate, in line with the “corporate model” of knowledge 
generation (Antonelli and Fassio, 2014). Therefore, it is less likely that collaboration with a 
university will lead to a relatively high economic impact invention by an employee of a large 
                                                 
19  Careful analysis of industry inventors’ interactions with a university shows that the channels of 
interactions are often complex and involve different types of formal and informal collaboration 
simultaneously. Inventors indicated that frequently they exploited several organizational forms. Even if 
the question on the governance of interactions was focused on the different types of contractual 
arrangements, and hence did not include the full spectrum of informal types of interactions, we found that 
personal and institutional collaborations often occurred in tandem with supervision of masters and 
doctoral students, or use of shared university laboratory facilities. Given the numerous possible 
combinations of interaction forms we ran a principal components analysis (PCA) on all the types 
indicated by our inventors, and extracted some factors that represent stylized ways of interacting with a 
university. The results of the PCA identify three main components: the first corresponds to personal 
contractual collaboration, the second refers mostly to institutional collaborations, and the third refers to 
ways of benefiting from academic knowledge that do not involve direct interaction. When we included 
the three factors in our value equation we found that personal contractual collaborations was positive and 
significantly larger than the coefficient of the institutional type of collaboration, confirming the 
robustness of our preferred specification in tables VII and VIII. 
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firm. However, micro companies and engineering consultancies which usually do not possess 
all the competences needed to develop innovations, gain comparatively more from collaborating 
with a university, and their inventions developed with the contribution of academic knowledge 
will be more likely to be their most valuable inventions. Technology dummies (not reported in 
the tables) are weakly significant.  
 
Table VIII. Tobit and IV on the Relative_economic_value of the two values 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tobit with sample 
selection 
Tobit with sample 
selection 
IV-2SLS IV-SLS 










   
 (0.088)    
Pcontracts  0.154* 0.464* 0.478* 
  (0.093) (0.275) (0.279) 
Institutional  -0.097 -0.028 -0.021 
  (0.094) (0.128) (0.129) 
Inventor characteristics 
Theories 0.180* 0.185** 0.187* 0.180* 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.096) (0.097) 
Methods 0.103 0.129 0.175* 0.186* 
 (0.112) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Applied 0.009 0.004 0.021 0.022 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.122) (0.122) 
Contact 0.035 0.032 0.008 0.016 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.109) (0.112) 
Age -0.040 -0.042 -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) 
Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publications -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male 0.192 0.229 0.259 0.252 
 (0.271) (0.239) (0.238) (0.234) 
Firm Characteristics    
Small and Medium Firms -0.100 -0.166 -0.213 -0.211 
 (0.164) (0.169) (0.186) (0.181) 
Large Firms -0.245 -0.300* -0.371* -0.380** 
 (0.155) (0.164) (0.192) (0.192) 
Technological capability 0.148* 0.156** 0.127** 0.128** 
(0.076) (0.067) (0.061) (0.062) 
Technological dummies yes yes yes yes 
First stage     
local   0.795*** 0.688*** 
   (0.202) (0.184) 
alumni_polito   0.334 - 
   (0.203) - 
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Share Italy   0.116 - 
      (0.224) - 
Wald test Pcontracts = Institutional 4.85 5.37 5.41 
p-value 0.027 0.020 0.020 
Underid. test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):               6.262 3.996 
p-value   0.099 0.045 
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments: 4.94 14.00 
Prob>F   0.004 0.00 
Hansen J statistic (overid. test of all instruments):          0.113 0.912 
 χ2 P-value     0.945 0.633 
athanrho 0.827* 0.743** - - 
 (0.488) (0.356) - - 
Observations 580 580 87 87 
Uncensored obs. 87 87 - - 
Equations in columns (1) and (2) are estimated with a Tobit Type II model with sample selection. The reference 
category for the size dummies are micro companies and individual inventors. In columns (3) and (4) the 
coefficients of a 2SLS  instrumental variable estimation are displayed, first stage coefficients are reported. All 
models include OST7-based technological dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, the results suggest the existence of a positive causal effect of personal contractual 
collaborations on the relative value of an invention developed with the contribution of 
university knowledge which is in line with our hypothesis, while institutional collaboration does 
not have an effect on invention value.20 
 
Robustness checks: the role of academic co-publication 
Alternative informal channels of interaction between industry inventors and university 
researchers such as co-authorship of academic papers, might influence the overall economic 
value of inventions. Gittelman and Kogut (2003) suggest that this is an important source of 
                                                 
20
 For some inventions we were able to identify the registered EPO patent of the invention with 
highest university contribution. We have hence run an additional robustness check of our 
specification using as the dependent variable the number of years for which the renewal fees were 
paid for each patent (controlling for the date of publication of the patent). This measure is a good 
alternative to our own measure of economic value and it is a better proxy than forward citations, 
which instead capture better the technological relevance of a patent (see also Harhoff et al., 1999; 
Arts and Fleming, 2018). Our results show that, even if we can only perform this estimation on 117 
patents (those for which we were able to identify the correspondent EPO patent), the results are in 
line with our measure of economic value: personal contractual collaborations still display a positive 
and significant coefficient, which is also significantly larger than the coefficient of institutional 
collaborations. Results are available from the corresponding author upon request.  
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academic knowledge for industry. To check this we collected the number of co-publications in 
Scopus involving the 164 industrial inventors in our main equation and academics.21  
 
 
Table IX. Robustness checks: the role of academic co-publications 
  (1) (2) 
 IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
 VARIABLES Highest_economic_impact Relative_economic_value  
   
Governance 
Pcontracts 0.561* 0.460* 
 (0.316) (0.277) 
Institutional 0.085 -0.032 
 (0.105) (0.132) 
Inventor characteristics 
  Academic co-publications 0.010 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Publications -0.006** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
   
Theories 0.147* 0.185* 
 (0.082) (0.095) 
Methods -0.005 0.175* 
 (0.070) (0.104) 
Applied -0.078 0.019 
 (0.090) (0.123) 
Contact 0.068 0.013 
 (0.084) (0.111) 
Age -0.054** -0.049 
 (0.022) (0.040) 
Age^2 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.142 0.255 
 (0.151) (0.234) 
Firm Characteristics   
Small and Medium Firms -0.078 -0.216 
 (0.175) (0.184) 
Large Firms -0.230 -0.370* 
 (0.163) (0.192) 
Technological capability 0.109* 0.122* 
(0.060) (0.065) 
Technological dummies yes yes 
First stage   
local 0.465** 0.809*** 
 (0.199) (0.217) 
alumni_polito 0.230* 0.313 
 (0.120) (0.194) 
Share Italy 0.308** 0.117 
                                                 
21 We identified publications in Scopus of inventors who coauthored academic papers, which allows us to 
identify academic co-authors and their affiliations. 
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  (0.154) (0.224) 
Wald test Pcontracts = Institutional 3.21 5.47 
p-value 0.073 0.019 
Underid. test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 8.738 4.81 
p-value 0.033 0.044 
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments: 3.85 6.17 
Prob>F 0.011 0.10 
Hansen J statistic (overid. test of all instruments): 0.058 0.129 
χ2 P-value 0.971 0.937 
   
Observations 164 87 
In column (1) the dependent variable is highest economic impact (dummy 0/1), in column (2) the 
dependent variable is relative economic value.In columns (1) and (2) the coefficients of a 2SLS 
instrumental variable estimation are displayed, first stage coefficients are reported. The reference category 
for the size dummies are micro companies and individual inventors. All models include OST7-based 
technological dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table IX presents the results obtained including this additional regressor among our control 
variables in the 2SLS instrumental variable regressions: the results point to a non-significant 
effect of the number of co-publications on the economic value of a patent, while the significant 
positive effect of personal contractual collaborations is still present. However, the first stage 
statistics of the IV estimation indicate that our instruments perform relatively worse than in our 
preferred estimation in tables VII and VIII. This is because the number of co-publications is 
partly correlated to the first stage instruments and our main variable of interest - Pcontract. It is 
possible that personal contracts lead to future co-publications. Another problem related to 
including the number of co-publications is that the economic value of an invention can affect 
future co-publications: a high economic value might boost them or might hinder them if secrecy 
conditions require non-disclosure of the knowledge produced. For these reasons co-publications 
is likely to be an endogenous variable (for which we would need to find additional instruments), 
thus we prefer the specification in tables VII and VIII. 
 
5. Discussion 
Since the mid-1990s, universities have been considered fundamental drivers of technological 
change and competitiveness in regional and national economic systems. The underlying 
assumption is that firms that interact with universities should be able to introduce more valuable 
innovations and increase their economic performance: however, little attention has been paid to 
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the type of contractual governance of university-industry interactions that contribute most to the 
value of industrial invention. Analyzing the effectiveness of different forms of governance of 
university-industry interactions would add to our understanding of how academic knowledge is 
translated into real industrial products and could shed light on the most profitable ways of 
managing structured interactions between organizations aimed at innovation.  
Overall, our empirical results show that the use of formal contractual interactions is correlated 
positively but insignificantly to the relative value of the invention. This result is not surprising 
given that, during the development of the invention, the inventors might have had other kinds of 
non-contractual interactions in parallel with (or in place of) contractual interactions, and 
therefore could have benefited from direct engagement with academics in one form or another, 
even in the absence of contractual arrangements. This is in line with several studies showing 
that companies use a mix of formal and informal interactions with universities depending on the 
objective and the content of the interaction (Abreu et al., 2008). However, the focus of our 
analysis is on the relative effect of different types of contractual governance on economic value. 
Here we are able to confirm that personal contracts between firms and individual academics, 
characterized by the firm’s greater control over the collaboration’s scope and objectives, 
increase the incentives for the academic to invest in translating university knowledge to allow 
its more effective integration in the firm’s knowledge base and promote innovation. This 
highlights the importance of promoting academic knowledge integration with the firm’s 
knowledge base through the development of firm absorptive capacity.  
In order to maximize the social and economic impact of academic knowledge, universities need 
to manage their interactions with industry carefully, and ensure that institutional contracts do 
not replace but enhance and complement personal ones. Personal contracts are likely to lead to 
more valuable inventions, but they often build upon pre-existing social ties. These are not 
automatic; they require time and effort and can be affected by the involvement of the university 
institution. For example, if the university insists on intellectual property rights concessions, the 
firm may withdraw from the collaboration (von Proff et al., 2012). Hence, the university should 
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pursue institutional collaborations with industry, but at the same time encourage the 
development of personal ties (based on alumni networks or past collaboration) between 
company inventors and academics, and allow academics to stipulate personal contracts if 
opportunities arise. There are specific situations in which institutional arrangements are 
especially beneficial. These situations might occur when the collaboration involves areas of 
research and scientific networks to which the firm does not have direct access and which are 
more distant from its knowledge. These types of collaborations tend to be explorative rather 
than exploitative and might benefit from the more open-ended definition of objectives in 
institutional contracts. 
Our analysis points also to the type of academic knowledge that industrial inventors consider 
most relevant for the development of inventions. In our sample, invention value increased with 
the inventor’s reliance on theoretical knowledge. This is in line with suggestions that the use of 
scientific knowledge allows for the production of more radical inventions, which have greater 
economic value. Using more applied academic knowledge does not exploit the specificity of 
academic research and therefore does not increase the value of resulting inventions compared 
with the value of the other inventions in the inventor’s portfolio. Hence, particularly for industry 
inventors who are not themselves engaging in academic research like those in our sample (who 
have, on average, low publication count) using theoretical scientific knowledge can help them to 
raise the novelty profile of their inventions. R&D managers should perhaps consider involving 
in collaborations with universities those inventors that are better able to appreciate the 
usefulness of basic theoretical knowledge, since these individuals will be better able to exploit 
academic knowledge in an Edison-bridging fashion (Subramanian et al., 2013) to increase their 
ability to produce valuable inventions.  
This study has some limitations. First, although our initial sample was relatively large, the 
information required to construct our dependent variables was available only for a smaller 
sample. Second, as in most studies that use survey data, our results could be, to some extent 
affected by common method bias. However, we have taken several steps to mitigate this risk. 
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The models include numerous variables from different sources than the PIEMINV survey (such 
as databases on academic publications, EPO patent data, balance sheet data from company 
registers). In the survey, the questions were of different types, with very few involving Likert 
scales; moreover, not many questions asked about inventors’ perceptions, while many asked 
simple facts about the innovation process (such as the form of governance and source of 
funding used).  Third, our sample only includes inventors from Piedmont, which allows for a 
substantial degree of consistency, but might mean that the results are not generalizable to other 
contexts. Piedmont is a relatively technologically advanced region with various industry 
specializations; it is possible that in areas with a different mix of economic activities the type of 
governance of interactions might have a different effect. The relatively limited geographic 
mobility of industry and academic inventors in the Piedmont region is likely to facilitate the 
formation of social links that lead to more fruitful personal contractual collaborations; these 
conditions may not apply to other contexts. In some contexts, certain arrangements (e.g., skilled 
innovation intermediaries) might have emerged to facilitate knowledge transfer and knowledge 
integration within institutional collaborations. Further studies in other contexts comparing the 
two forms of governance analyzed would shed light on this.  
Fourth, the study focuses only on the invention with the highest contribution from academic 
knowledge: it would be interesting to see whether our results hold for inventions with more 
moderate levels of academic knowledge which in some cases, may account for most of the 
firm’s invention portfolio. Lastly, this study should be seen as a first step opening up a broader 
line of research into the relative effects of different governance forms on invention value. The 
study contrasted two ways of research contracting between university and industry, but 
collaborations not involving direct research contracts occur in many other ways (for example, 
through informal interactions, joint supervision of graduates and sharing of research laboratories 
among many others). Further research could explore whether these other forms of collaboration, 
whether carried out in isolation or in combination with formal research contracting, affect the 
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value of industry inventions, and particularly whether certain combinations of governance forms 
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APPENDIX A: The PIEMINV Survey 
The PIEMINV questionnaire was administered in autumn 2009 and spring 2010. It was 
addressed to inventors and was designed to investigate various aspects of university-industry 
interactions in the Italian region of Piedmont, and to enable quantitative measurement of the 
local universities’ contribution to the invention process. It asked for information on: (i) the 
individual characteristics of Piedmontese inventors; (ii) which channels are used most 
frequently for university-industry knowledge transfer; (iii) the forms of governance of 
interactions; (iv) inventors’ motivations and objectives in using different interaction channels. 
The questionnaire (presented in full below) has four parts asking for different types of 
information, for a total of 41 questions. 
1. General information related to inventors (age, gender, education, mobility) and their 
inventive activity (age at first patent, office where patents were first filed, invention: 
innovation ratio). 
2. Overall evaluation of the importance of university knowledge in the development of 
inventions and the relative importance of different interaction channels. 
3. Evaluation of the effectiveness, frequency and nature of university-industry interaction 
channels used to pursue different firm objectives. 
4. Assessment of the economic impact of university knowledge (this section only refers to 
two specific inventions for each inventor) 
Additional information on patent technology classes was collected, to enable a better 
understanding of the technology in which each inventor is active. Technology macro-classes for 
each inventor were attributed using the most common technology class found in the inventors’ 
patent portfolio.22  
The questionnaires were administered to 2,916 industry inventors, obtaining 938 valid 
responses (response rate 31%). The following criteria were applied to decide inclusion in the 
survey23: 
a) the person is named as ‘inventor’ on at least one patent application filed (for the first 
time or as an extension) with the EPO; 
b) the patent application was filed with the EPO between 1998 and 2005; 
c) the inventor’s address on the patent application is a location in the Piedmont region. 
                                                 
22 Classification by macro-technology classes is according to OST-DT7 (OST, 2004). 
23 Questionnaires were sent by email wherever possible; where email addresses could not be identified, or 
where paper based questionnaires were requested, these were delivered by ordinary mail with an option to 
respond on an online platform.   
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Although surveys are the only method to recover certain kinds of data on inventors and the 
inventive process, they have some shortcomings. Since the survey is inventor-based (and not 
firm-based), it does not necessarily include all the innovative firms in the Piedmont region. 
Moreover, since the sample is based on inventors of EPO patent applications, it is biased in 
favour of inventors employed in large firms. It must also be stressed that the survey is based 
upon applications for patents to the EPO in 1998 to 2005, regardless of whether they were 
granted or rejected. Finally the survey cannot completely rule out a possible underestimation of 
highly mobile inventors (which the patent literature claims are more productive on average), 
since inventor’s addresses on patents are not updated. This problem was partly reduced by 
considering an eight-year time frame. 
The governance of university industry relations 
A specific question of the questionnaire asked inventors to indicate which type of governance 
was used for the invention with the highest level of university contribution (and for the 
invention with the highest economic impact). The question, reported below in Table A1, 
focused on specific contract-based type of arrangements, focusing in particular on the use of 
institutional research collaborations, as opposed to contracts with individual university 
researchers. In our analyses we classified interactions as collaboration (Collaboration) -i.e. 
whether the development of the invention involved any form of contract-based collaboration 
with a university scientist- if the inventor answered ‘yes’ to at least one of the answers 1, 2 or 3 
of Table A1. Then we distinguished between different types of contract-based collaborations. 
We classified a contract-based collaboration as institutional (Institutional), i.e. stipulated with a 
university institution, if the inventor answered ‘yes’ to at least one of the answers 1 and 2 of 
Table A1. Finally we classified interactions as personal contract (PContract) if the inventor 
answered ‘yes’ to answer 3 of Table A1. The inventors could also indicate other non-contractual 
types of arrangements: these included the supervision of masters or PhD students (answer 4), as 
well as the sharing of facilities such as labs or equipment (answer 5). It must be stressed that the 
inventors could indicate the joint use of different types of interactions.24  
For a more detailed analysis of the PIEMINV survey see Cecchelli et al. (2012). The database is 




                                                 
24
 The options provided to inventors concerning the non-contractual interactions clearly do not 
include the full spectrum of informal types of interactions, such as informal contacts, participation to 
academic conferences, reading of scientific publications or patents, co-authorship of academic 
papers, and possibly other types of interactions. However the design of the question was mainly 
aimed to collect  detailed information on the modes of use of contract-based collaborations. 
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Table A1. Question from the PIEMINV survey: “did the inventive process include any of the 
following organizational arrangements?” 
 Your invention with the highest 
contribution from university 
knowledge 
Your invention with the highest 
economic impact 
1. Institutional research 
collaborations between your 
company and the university 
(department, faculty, university, 
technology transfer office), 
financed by the company 
  
2. Institutional research 
collaborations between your 
company and the university, 
financed through public funds 
(regional, national or 
international) 
  
3. Personal contracts between 
your company and individual 
university researchers 
  
4. Collaborations based on co-
supervision of Masters or PhD 
students 
  
5. Sharing facilities (e.g. 
laboratories, equipment) with the 
university 
  








Table B1. Correlation table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Highest economic impact 1.000 
               
2 Relative economic value 0.727* 1.000 
              
3 Collaboration 0.069 0.024 1.000 
             
4 Pcontracts 0.107 0.122 0.562* 1.000 
            




           
6 Theories 0.148 0.319* 0.002 -0.053 0.032 1.000 
          
7 Methods 0.018 0.091 0.061 0.022 0.032 -0.013 1.000 
         
8 Applied -0.149 -0.104 -0.094 -0.034 -0.073 -0.223* -0.140 1.000 
        






       




      
11 Age 0.003 -0.061 0.081 -0.042 0.141 -0.0651 0.038 -0.017 0.086 0.197* 1.000 
     






    
13 University work experience -0.005 -0.225* 0.106 0.151 0.014 -0.014 -0.068 0.119 -0.062 0.040 0.127 0.164* 1.000 
   
14 Publications -0.080 -0.217* 0.138 0.045 0.100 -0.078 -0.060 -0.142 0.106 -0.001 0.128 0.184* 0.198* 1.000 
  
15 Academic co-publications 0.042 -0.097 0.200* 0.093 0.126 -0.032 -0.033 -0.084 0.032 0.001 0.080 0.192* 0.156* 0.775* 1.000 
 
16 Technological productivity 0.023 -0.147 0.094 0.116 -0.009 -0.233* -0.122 0.006 0.112 0.072 0.179* -0.016 0.049 0.117 0.172* 1.000 
17 Micro firms 0.034 0.050 -0.079 -0.116 0.047 0.057 0.039 -0.113 -0.060 -0.054 0.055 -0.059 -0.031 -0.109 -0.113 -0.097 
18 Small and Medium Firms 0.063 0.041 -0.137 -0.010 
-
0.172* 
0.006 0.043 0.018 0.096 0.140 0.124 0.024 0.087 -0.036 -0.014 -0.061 
19 Large Firms -0.076 -0.070 0.169* 0.083 0.116 -0.0424 -0.063 0.057 -0.043 -0.085 -0.142 0.017 -0.054 0.101 0.086 0.115 
20 Foreign Firms 0.008 0.077 0.104 0.162* -0.060 0.021 0.0909 -0.061 0.025 0.048 0.056 -0.049 0.223* 0.119 0.086 0.038 
21 Technological capability 0.103 0.116 0.060 0.028 0.095 -0.002 0.033 0.097 -0.089 0.082 0.001 0.081 0.082 0.111 0.185* 0.010 







23 Alumni_polito 0.079 0.081 0.068 0.097 0.005 -0.013 -0.144 -0.138 0.075 -0.030 -0.054 0.173* 0.046 0.034 0.079 0.267* 




Table B1. …continued 
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
17 Micro firms 1.000 
       
18 Small and Medium Firms -0.135 1.000 
      
19 Large Firms -0.529* -0.768* 1.000 
     
20 Foreign Firms -0.110 -0.109 0.1650* 1.000 
    
21 Technological capability -0.159* -0.221* 0.292* 0.064 1.000 
   
22 Local 0.072 0.016 -0.061 0.046 -0.050 1.000 
  
23 Alumni_polito 0.039 0.064 -0.080 -0.123 -0.084 -0.060 1.000 
 
24 Share Italy -0.118 -0.034 0.106 -0.041 0.223* -0.108 -0.082 1.000 
Note: correlations are calculated for the 164 inventors included in the empirical estimation of equation (1). Asterisks 






Table B2. Probit with sample selection on Highest_economic_impact (full specification) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection equation Probit Selection equation Probit 





Collaboration - 0.107 - - 
 - (0.083) - - 
Pcontracts - - - 0.151 
 - - - (0.098) 
Institutional - - - 0.023 
 - - - (0.094) 
Inventor Characteristics  
  
 
Theories - 0.167* - 0.167* 
 - (0.097) - (0.098) 
Methods - -0.011 - -0.008 
 - (0.083) - (0.083) 
Applied - -0.107 - -0.107 
 - (0.094) - (0.094) 
Contact - 0.075 - 0.068 
 - (0.095) - (0.094) 
Publications - -0.006 - -0.006 
 - (0.004) - (0.004) 
Male 0.045 -0.090 0.045 -0.105 
 (0.056) (0.154) (0.056) (0.155) 
Age -0.022 -0.059** -0.022 -0.054** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.026) 
Age^2 0.000* 0.001** 0.000* 0.001** 



















Firm Characteristics  
 
 
Small and Medium Firms -0.077 0.016 -0.077 -0.003 
 (0.059) (0.172) (0.059) (0.172) 
Large Firms 0.009 -0.140 0.009 -0.144 
 (0.060) (0.159) (0.060) (0.162) 
Technological capability -0.024 0.146** -0.024 0.142** 
 (0.035) (0.071) (0.035) (0.071) 
Technological dummies yes yes yes  
Wald test Pcontracts = Institutional - - - 1.10 
p-value - - - 0.294 
athanrho -0.166 -0.166 -0.139 -0.139 
 (0.411) (0.411) (0.402) (0.402) 
Observations 657 164 657 164 
Columns (2) and (4) report the results of the estimation of a probit model with sample selection, where the dependent variable is 
Highest_economic_impact. Columns (1) and (3) reports the coefficient of the selection equation, where the dependent variable is 
Contribution. The reference category for the size dummies are micro companies and individual inventors. In all columns, marginal 
effects (at the sample mean) are displayed. All models include OST7-based technological dummies. The selection equations also 






Table B3. Tobit with sample selection on the Relative_economic_value of the two values (full 
specification) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection equation Probit Selection equation Probit 





    
Collaboration - 0.048 - - 
 - (0.088) - - 
Pcontracts - - - 0.154* 
 - - - (0.093) 
Institutional - - - -0.097 





Theories - 0.180* - 0.185** 
 - (0.095) - (0.091) 
Methods - 0.103 - 0.129 
 - (0.112) - (0.105) 
Applied - 0.009 - 0.004 
 - (0.105) - (0.105) 
Contact - 0.035 - 0.032 
 - (0.102) - (0.101) 
Publications - -0.003* - -0.003 
 - (0.002) - (0.002) 
Male 0.089* 0.192 0.089* 0.229 
 (0.032) (0.271) (0.032) (0.239) 
Age -0.014 -0.040 -0.014 -0.042 
 (0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.040) 
Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















Firm Characteristics  
 
 
Small and Medium Firms -0.041 -0.100 -0.041 -0.166 
 (0.046) (0.164) (0.046) (0.169) 
Large Firms -0.060 -0.245 -0.060 -0.300* 
 (0.052) (0.155) (0.052) (0.164) 
Technological capability 0.016 0.148* 0.016 0.156** 
 (0.028) (0.076) (0.028) (0.067) 
Technological dummies yes yes yes  
Wald test Pcontracts = Institutional - - - 4.85 
p-value - - - 0.027 
athanrho 0.827* 0.827* 0.743** 0.743** 
 (0.488) (0.488) (0.356) (0.356) 
Observations 580 87 580 87 
Columns (2) and (4) report the results of the estimation of a Tobit Type II model with sample selection, where the dependent 
variable is Relative_economic_value. Columns (1) and (3) reports the coefficient of the selection equation, where the dependent 
variable is Contribution. The reference category for the size dummies are micro companies and individual inventors. In columns 
(1) and (3), marginal effects (at the sample mean) are displayed. All models include OST7-based technological dummies. The 
selection equations also include a dummy for foreign ownership (foreign). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
